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Abstract
We examine potential nonlinear behaviour in the conduct of monetary policy by the Bank of
England. We find significant nonlinearity in this policy setting, and in particular that the standard
Taylor rule really only begins to bite once expected inflation is significantly above its target. This
suggests, for example, that while the stated objective of the Bank of England is to pursue a sym-
metric inflation target, in practice some degree of asymmetry has crept into interest-rate setting.
We argue that, nevertheless, the very predictability of the policy rule, especially when set out in a
highly plausible and intuitive nonlinear framework, is perhaps one reason why the United King-
dom has, since the early 1990s, enjoyed price stability combined with relatively strong growth.
∗Corresponding author: Professor Mark P. Taylor, Department of Economics, University of War-
wick, Coventry CV4 7AL, United Kingdom.
1 Introduction
In recent years a great deal of work has established the appealing features of
interest rate rules in conducting and monitoring monetary policy. The virtues
of an interest rate or Taylor rule1–in which the policy instrument interest
rate is determined as a linear function of the deviations of inflation from its
target and the deviations of output from its potential level (the output gap)–
stem from its simplicity and its ability to serve either as an informative input
or as a more decisive factor in the implementation of monetary policy.
While empirical evidence from various countries2 indicates that Taylor
rules are often able to capture the salient dynamics of the relevant short-
term interest rate, it is frequently argued that simple linear rules may not
be adequate to capture the complexities arising in the conduct of monetary
policy. In particular, it is possible that a Taylor rule may not have a simple
linear form, but instead is best described by a more complex nonlinear form;
indeed, a growing body of research indicates that the likelihood of nonlinear-
ities in the conduct of monetary policy is considerably high. For example,
Blinder (1997), inter alios,3 argues that it is not optimal for the central bank
to contract demand in the event of small deviations of inflation from target;
instead, it should fight inflation when it is favourable to do so, in terms of
the incremental output reduction that will have to be incurred in that case:
squeezing the last drop of above-target inflation out of the economy may be
too costly because of a worsening trade-oﬀ between inflation and output at
low levels of inflation. In addition, it may be that there are important asym-
metries and nonlinearities in the business cycle, which would require policy
makers to condition the interest rate response of policy nonlinearly on the
output gap, and indeed the eﬀects of monetary policy shocks do appear to be
more profound in recessions than in expansions.4
Similarly, asymmetry in the central bank’s preferences regarding the weight
assigned to deviations of inflation from target and the output gap might give
rise to a nonlinear interest rate reaction function. In this setup, central banks
do not weigh equally positive and negative deviations of inflation from their
targets, resulting in an asymmetric response of monetary policy. Dolado,
Maria-Dolores and Naveira (2000), for example, provide evidence that the US
1After Taylor (1999a, 1999b, 1997, 1993a and 1993b).
2Clarida, Gali and Gertler (1998, 2000)
3See, e.g. Orphanides, Small, Wieland and Wilcox (1997) and Orphanides and Wilcox
(1996).
4Recent research in this direction includes work by Peel and Speight (1998); Dolado,
Maria-Dolores and Naveira (2002); Dolado, Maria-Dolores and Ruge-Murcia (2002); Surico
(2002); and Nobay and Peel (2000).
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Federal Reserve (Fed) and several European central banks have in the past
responded more aggressively to positive compared to negative deviations of
inflation from its target. In line with this finding, Gerlach (2000) attributes
the high inflation found prior to Volcker’s chairmanship at the Fed to Vol-
cker’s more aggressive response to the output gap in the wake of the first oil
shock in 1973. In other research, the increased sensitivity of the central bank
to negative output gaps along in the presence of uncertainty regarding the
state of the economy is considered by Cukierman (2000) and Ruge-Murcia
(2003) to be the driving forces of inflation bias.
Moreover, while nonlinearities in the Taylor rule can be the result of ei-
ther nonlinearity in the macroeconomic structure of an economy (the output-
inflation trade-oﬀ) or of asymmetry in the central bank’s preferences, it is
quite likely that both of these features are present in the economy and inter-
act to exacerbate the degree of nonlinearity in the policy rule.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In Section II we
provide an exposition of our nonlinear empirical models and methods and
in Section III we present background information on the implementation of
monetary policy at the UK, along with a description of the data used in
this study. In a fourth section, we report estimation results for the models
considered while in a final section we draw some conclusions from our analysis.
2 Modelling Nonlinearity in the Taylor Rule
A simple way of capturing nonlinearities in policy behaviour is to estimate
threshold models whereby the policy rule switches into a diﬀerent regime
whenever a certain variable (in this case inflation itself seems most appropri-
ate) breaches one or more thresholds. It may be, for example, that when
inflation is in the neighbourhood of the target level, the authorities pursue a
largely accommodating monetary policy, so that changes in the interest rate
are more or less random since they are responding to random shocks to the
economy. Once inflation rises above a given level, however, the central bank
may be more aggressive in linking interest rate movements to the implicit
policy rule, so that the Taylor rule best describes short-run interest rate be-
haviour above that level. Similarly, if inflation falls below a certain level this
may generate fears of deflation and the authorities may again implement a
Taylor rule–but not necessarily the same one that is employed (explicitly or
implicitly) when inflation is high. This would suggest a three-regime model
on which we can impose and test various restrictions.
Following Clarida, Gali and Gertler (1998, 2000), we use the following
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forward-looking Taylor rule as our baseline linear model for t = 1, ..., n:
i∗t = i
∗ + β(E(πt,k|Ωt)− π∗) + γE(xt|Ωt), (1)
where i∗t is the desired value of the short-term nominal interest rate, πt,k
denotes the percentage change in the price level between periods t and t+ k,
π∗ is the target for inflation, xt is a measure of the output gap in period t (with
the output gap defined as the percentage deviation of actual GDP from its
potential level), E(·|Ωt) is the conditional expectation operator, conditioned
on information available to the monetary authorities at time t, Ωt, and i∗ is,
by construction, the desired nominal interest rate when inflation and output
are at their target levels. This forward-looking Taylor rule nests the simple
interest rate rule originally proposed by Taylor (1999a,b) if either inflation
or the cross product of inflation and output gap are suﬃcient proxies for
expected inflation. Moreover, the forward-looking specification encapsulates
the view that the central bank uses all the information at its disposal in order
to form an opinion about inflation and output, as implied by the inclusion of
conditional expectations of inflation and output.
We assume that the central bank adjusts interest rates in a cautious way
through smoothing in the form of partial adjustment as follows:
it = (1− ρ)i∗t + ρit−1 + υt. (2)
The exogenous random shock υt could reflect either the randomness to policy
or imperfect forecast of demand for reserves derived by the central bank.
According to this partial adjustment behaviour, the central bank at each
period adjusts its instrument in order to eliminate only a fraction (1 − ρ)
of the gap between its current target level and some linear combination of
its past values. Smooth adjustment in interest rates may be rationalised, for
example, as fear of disrupting capital markets or fear of the loss of credibility
that might result from large and sudden policy reversals, or the need to build
a consensus, in order to support a policy change. In addition, interest-rate
smoothing may be thought of as a learning device by the central bank, which
may not have a full knowledge of economy due to imperfect information.
Re-parameterizing (1) using (2):
M4 : it = α0 + α1it−1 + α2πt,k + α3xt + t, (3)
where α0 = (i∗ − βπ∗)(1 − ρ), α1 = ρ, α2 = β(1 − ρ), α3 = γ(1 − ρ) and
t = (1 − ρ){β(E(πt,k|Ωt) − πt,k) + γ(xt − E(xt|Ωt))} + υt. For reasons that
shall presently become clear, we label this model M4.
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The forward-looking Taylor ruleM4 is an approximation to forecast-based
rules of the kind proposed by Rudebusch and Svensson (1999) and Batini and
Haldane (1998). These forecast-based rules are the outcome of dynamic struc-
tural optimizing models that take into account lags in the monetary transmis-
sion mechanism attributable, for example, to price stickiness (Rotemberg and
Woodford, 1999) or to rigidities in the money market (Christiano, Eichen-
baum and Evans, 1997; Christiano and Gust, 1999). Due to these lags, an
unexpected monetary shock will aﬀect output and employment after some
time, while the final impact on the price level, following the change in output
and employment, will require an extra lag subject to private sector’s beliefs
regarding how monetary policy will respond in the future. In this respect,
these dynamic structural optimizing models5 assert that welfare can be max-
imised following stabilization of forecast inflation around an appropriately
chosen target at some horizon. Thus, in order to control for inflation the
policy instrument should respond to deviations of inflation forecast from the
assumed target attempting a reduction of such departures.
To develop a general, nonlinear format for the Taylor rule, we start by
allowing for the possibility that the interest rate instrument might experience
three regimes depending on whether inflation is above, below, or inside a band
around the target level. If inflation is inside the band, the short-term interest
rate will eﬀectively be indeterminate with random changes arising from ran-
dom shocks to the economy–i.e. it will follow a random walk. If inflation is
below the band, the interest rate will respond to changes of expected inflation
and output gap according to a Taylor rule, while it will respond according
to a diﬀerent Taylor rule in the event that inflation is above the band. The
resulting, very general nonlinear Taylor rule is our baseline empirical model,
which we term M1:
M1 : it =
⎧
⎨
⎩
α0 + α1it−1 + α2πt,k + α3xt + t If πt ≥ π1
it−1 + t If π2 < πt < π1
β0 + β1it−1 + β2πt,k + β3xt + t If πt ≤ π2
(4)
where t, the disturbance term, is assumed to be white noise and where π1 >
π2. Note that this model nests the simple linear Taylor rule model, M4 (set
π1 = π2 = 0 so that the random walk regime and the lower regime eﬀectively
disappear–given that inflation over the sample period was not negative).
The thresholds π1 and π2 can be estimated along with the other parameters
by minimizing an appropriate criterion function using a two-dimensional grid
5See Muscatelli and Trecroci (2000) and the references therein.
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search over the interval Π∗ = [min(πt),max(πt)]. Hansen (1996) has shown
that, under fairly weak regularity conditions, a grid search that minimizes
the total sum squared residuals will provide consistent estimates of both the
thresholds and the model parameters (see also Coakley, Fuertes and Perez,
2003). In the present application, however, we are proxying expected future
values of inflation and the output gap using actual values, and these will be
correlated with the regression error term since the latter includes expecta-
tional errors, so that a simple least squares approach is not appropriate. In
addition, there will clearly also be an endogeneity issue and, because of over-
lapping forecast errors entering the error term, it will have a moving average
representation of order k − 1. For these reasons, we employed a generalized
method of moments (GMM) estimator and a grid search for the pair (π2, π1)
that minimizes the value of the GMM criterion function in the range Π∗. The
criterion function that GMM minimizes is defined as:
J = ˆ0ZW−1Z 0ˆ (5)
where ˆ is the estimated residual vector and Z is a vector of c instruments
that are included in the information set and are exogenous (or predetermined)
so that their correlation with the regression errors is zero: E(Z 0ε) = 0. This
orthogonality condition will generally not hold exactly in-sample for estimated
values of , but the GMM estimator works by minimizing a weighted average of
the squared values of the c sample moments Z 0ˆ. An eﬃcient GMM estimator
can be constructed in the linear model using a two-step procedure to construct
the weight matrixW based upon centred estimates of the moment conditions
(see e.g. Hansen, 2003). With the weight matrix chosen in this way, our
estimation strategy was then to use a grid-search procedure to satisfy
(π2, π1) = arg minπ1,π2∈Π∗ J, π1 > π2. (6)
In eﬀect, this approach is generalization of the estimation method originally
suggested by Clarida et al. (1998) to allow for threshold eﬀects.
The model M1 collapses to a two-regime, two-Taylor rules model if π1 =
π2 = πˆ, that is, when the interest rate does not experience an intermediate
regime of indeterminacy. In that case, the interest rate will behave according
to two diﬀerent Taylor rules depending on whether inflation is above or below
a single threshold. We label this model M2:
M2 : it =
½
α0 + α1it−1 + α2πt,k + α2x+ t If πt ≥ πˆ
β0 + β1it−1 + β2πt,k + β3xt + t If πt < πˆ
(7)
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Model M2 further reduces to a two-regime (one random walk—one Taylor
rule) model, if β1 = 1 and β0 = β2 = β3 = 0 . The resulting model postulates
that the interest rate might behave either as a random walk or respond to a
forward-looking Taylor rule depending on whether inflation is below or above
an single inflation threshold πˆ. We call that model M3 and it takes the
following form:
M3 : it =
½
α0 + α1it−1 + α2πt,k + α3xt + t If πt ≥ πˆ
it−1 + t If πt < πˆ
(8)
The estimation of the threshold along with the other parameters of M2 and
M3 involves the implementation of GMM estimator in the context of a one-
dimensional grid search over the range Π∗:
πˆ = arg minπ1∈Π∗ J (9)
where J is the function minimized by GMM, as before.
3 Background Information and Dataset De-
scription
3.1 The evolution of inflation targeting as a policy frame-
work for the U.K.
Within a few months of coming to power in late 1979, the Conservative gov-
ernment under Margaret Thatcher announced the ‘Medium Term Financial
Strategy’ (MTFS), which was essentially a five-year programme of targets for
monetary growth and public sector deficits. Although monetary targeting
had in fact been introduced in Britain in the mid 1970s as a condition for
IMF support in the wake of the 1976 sterling crisis, the Labour government’s
commitment to the targets had never been credible. The announcement of
the MTFS, however, was a textbook example of how a strong and credible
commitment to a transparent deflationary policy can reduce inflation expec-
tations and shift down the short-run Phillips curve, and U.K. inflation came
down rapidly from around 20 percent per annum in 1980 to about 5 percent by
1983. In the event, however, it turned out to be much more diﬃcult to control
the money supply, and in particular to control the broad measures which had
formed the core of the original MTFS. To a large extent this was due to a
process of financial sector reforms that the Thatcher government also carried
out. For example, the government abolished special taxes on high-interest
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rate bank deposits (‘the corset’), abolished exchange control and also intro-
duced new legislation that allowed banks as well as building societies to lend
money for the purposes of house purchase. These reforms and the various fi-
nancial innovations of the 1980s (such as the introduction of interest-bearing
current accounts) aﬀected the stability of money demand so that monetary
growth was in fact much more diﬃcult to predict and, throughout the 1980s,
the government’s monetary targets were generally overshot.
Towards the end of the 1980s, therefore, the government began to think
of other indicators of the tightness of monetary policy and in particular the
exchange rate, which in an open economy like the U.K. is a particularly im-
portant indicator of the monetary stance. Also, given the relative success
of Germany in controlling its money supply in most of the postwar period,
linking the value of sterling to the Deutsche mark, either informally or for-
mally through full membership of the Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM) of
the European Monetary System, seemed an attractive way of ‘importing’ Ger-
man monetary policy. Following a period of informal shadowing of the mark,
the UK in fact entered the European Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM) in
October 1990.
Three inter-related factors conspired against sterling’s membership of the
ERM, however. The first was that sterling had entered the ERM at a rate at
which the U.K. currency appeared overvalued according to purchasing power
parity comparisons, so that it moved to the bottom of its admissable range
of fluctuation from the outset. Second, the deepening recession of the British
economy at this time, accompanied by relatively low inflation, called for reduc-
tions in short-term interest rates, so that there was a clear conflict between
internal and external policy objectives. Third, scenting the U.K.’s policy
dilemma, sterling became a focus for sustained selling in the speculative at-
tack on the ERM of September 1992 that eventually forced sterling out of the
mechanism.
With the experience of the 1980s ruling out a return to monetary targeting
as a credible policy alternative, the next phase in U.K. monetary policy was a
shift to a framework of inflation targeting. Such a framework had a good deal
of intellectual respectability, especially when implemented by an independent
and ‘conservative’ central bank (Rogoﬀ, 1985). It had been pioneered, appar-
ently with some success, by New Zealand in 1990 and by Canada in 1991, and
was arguably a natural choice of policy framework for the U.K.6 In 1997, the
incoming Labour government took the next logical step of granting indepen-
dence in the conduct of monetary policy to the Bank of England, a decision
6The same was true of Sweden, who also turned to inflation targeting after being forced
out of the ERM a few months after the U.K.’s exit.
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that was formally ratified in the 1998 Bank of England Act. According to
that Act, the Bank of England’s objectives are to promote price stability and,
subject to that commitment, to support the government’s economic policy
with respect to economic growth and employment. The Bank was originally
charged with maintaining a 2.5 percent inflation target, that was eﬀectively
symmetric in the sense that deviations above and below target were appar-
ently deemed equally undesirable: the Governor of the Bank of England is
obliged to write formally to the Chancellor of the Exchequer (the U.K. Fi-
nance Minister) to explain occasions when inflation is above 3.5 percent or
below 1.5 percent, including an account of the measures that will be taken to
force inflation towards its target, the estimated duration of this process and
how the remedial measures may aﬀect the government’s other macroeconomic
policy objectives.7
3.2 Data
Given that inflation targeting has been formally enshrined in British monetary
policy for more than a decade, the time seems opportune to examine the
data for evidence of Taylor-rule behaviour in the policy actions of the Bank
of England and, in particular, whether the existence of formal targets has
induced nonlinearity in this behaviour.
To that end, monthly data were retrieved from Datastream for the infla-
tion targeting period, from October 1992 to January 2003. The interest rate
used for the purposes of this analysis is the monthly average of the interbank
interest rate of the three month treasury bill. We proxy inflation by the an-
nualized month-to-month percentage change of the retail price index (RPI)
that excludes mortgage interest payments, RPIX (since RPIX inflation was
the measure targeted by the authorities during our sample period). For the
construction of output gap, the industrial production index is used. Follow-
ing the previous literature on the estimation of Taylor rules, we construct the
output gap using the Hodrick-Prescott cyclical component of the logarithm
of industrial production.
The list of instruments that we used for the GMM estimation of the models
includes a constant and lagged values of the short term interest rate, the
output gap, inflation based on the RPI and on the producer price index. The
RPIX excluding mortgage interest payments and indirect taxes, RPIY, is also
7This policy goal has subsequently changed to 2.0 percent, and is now defined in terms
of the harmonized consumer price index, although this does not aﬀect the sample period
considered in the present analysis.
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included in the instrument set.8. We follow previous researchers, including
Clarida et al. (1998), and assume an inflation target horizon of three months
in our empirical work.
4 Empirical Results
In order to examine which of the models considered above fits the data best,
we performed a sequence of nested tests. In this setup, we test each model
against its more specific counterpart. For this purpose, we construct a quasi
likelihood ratio (Q-LR) test statistic as follows:
Q− LR = Jrestricted − Junrestricted (10)
where Jf for f = restricted, unrestricted, is the objective function that GMM
minimizes for the restricted and unrestricted models, respectively. Following
Hansen (1996), we perform a non-parametric bootstrap simulation procedure
in order to derive the empirical significance levels of these test statistics. The
non-parametric bootstrap that we apply has the following steps: 1. Estimate
the restricted model using the full sample of T observations and store the
residuals and the fitted values of the interest rate; 2. draw with equal proba-
bility and with replacement from the vector of residuals to make up another
T ×1 vector of residuals; 3. add this vector to the vector of fitted values of the
interest rate obtained in step 1 to obtain an artificial vector of interest rate
observations; 4. estimate the restricted and the unrestricted models using the
artificial interest rate vector and construct a value of the Q-LR statistic; 5.
repeat steps 2 − 4 five thousand times. This yields five thousand simulated
values for the Q-LR statistic. The percentage of occasions that the simulated
values of the Q-LR statistic exceed the actual value of the Q-LR statistic then
corresponds to the empirical marginal significance level of the actual statistic.
The resulting empirical marginal significance levels for the nested sequence
of tests–M2 against M1, M3 against M2, and M4 against M3–are given
in Table 1, and show that, using a nominal test size of five percent, while
M2 is not rejected against M1, andM3 is not rejected against M2, the most
restrictive, linear Taylor rule model, M4, is rejected at the five percent level
against M3, indicating significant nonlinearity in the Taylor rule.
Closer scrutiny of the estimation results for M2 (Table 2), however, re-
vealed that in this model, two of the four estimated coeﬃcients in the Taylor
8The lag structure that we imposed follows Clarida et al. (1998). Namely, we apply six
lags for the interest rate, the inflation, the output gap, RPI, RPIY and RPIX inflation and
the producer price index, plus the ninth and the twelfth lags of these variables.
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rule for the low-inflation regime (the intercept and the expected inflation coef-
ficient) were insignificantly diﬀerent from zero at the five percent level, while
the point estimate of the partial adjustment coeﬃcient was significant and
close to unity and the output gap coeﬃcient was also significantly diﬀerent
from zero at the five percent level. This suggested that the insignificant
QLR statistic obtained in moving from M2 to M3 may have been largely
dominated by the two insignificant coeﬃcients. Accordingly, we investigated
a further model of the form:
M10 : it =
⎧
⎨
⎩
α0 + α1it−1 + α2πt,k + α3xt + t If πt ≥ π1
it−1 + t If π2 < πt < π1
it−1 + β3xt + t If πt ≤ π2
, (11)
which may be viewed as a variant of M1, with β0 = β2 = 0 and β1 = 1
set to unity, and which we label M10. M10 involves three regimes, a low-
inflation regime in which the interest rate is highly persistent but does respond
to some extent to the output gap, a middle regime in which interest rates
are indeterminate and follow a random walk, and a high-inflation regime in
which a normal, forward-looking Taylor rule applies. Since the middle and
lower regimes have only the output gap coeﬃcient diﬀerentiating them, it
then seemed reasonable to examine whether they can be collapsed into a
single lower regime, which would be equivalent to imposing the restrictions
π1 = π2 = bπ holds, which would result in a model similar to M2 except with
β0 = β2 = 0 and β1 = 1, and which we therefore label M2
0.
The empirical marginal significance level for the QLR test of M20 against
M10 is also reported in Table 1, and reveals that we cannot reject M20, so
that M20, in which all estimated coeﬃcients are significantly diﬀerent from
zero at the five percent level, becomes our final, preferred specification. The
parameter estimates are given in Table 3, but we can repeat them here for
convenience:
M20 : it =
½
1.53 + 0.45it−1 + 0.70πt,k + 0.23xt +bt If πt ≥ 3.1
it−1 + 0.05xt +bt If πt < 3.1 .
(12)
Above the threshold inflation rate of 3.1 percent, our preferred model
becomes a standard, forward-looking Taylor rule with interest-rate smoothing
in which both expected inflation and the output gap appear significantly, but
with greater weight attached to deviations form the inflation target, consistent
10 Studies in Nonlinear Dynamics & Econometrics Vol. 10 [2006], No. 4, Article 1
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with the Bank of England’s remit to give priority to price stabilisation.
If we re-parameterize (12) to a form in which the deviation of expected
inflation from target appears as an explanatory variable, using the stated
inflation target of 2.5 percent explicitly, it becomes:
it = (1.53 + 0.7× 2.5) + 0.45it−1 + 0.70(πt,k − 2.5) + 0.23xt +bt
= 3.28 + 0.45it−1 + 0.70(πt,k − 2.5) + 0.23xt +bt
In long-run equilibrium, when the output gap is zero and the inflation target
achieved, and it = it−1 = i, (and we assume bt = 0), this implies a long-run
nominal interest rate of i = 3.28/(1 − 0.45) or almost exactly 6 percent per
annum. With an inflation rate of 2.5 percent, this in turn implies a long-
run equilibrium real rate of interest of about 3.5 percent per annum, which
seems reasonable. Similarly, the long-run coeﬃcient on the inflation term is
0.70/(1 − 0.45) = 1.27, satisfying the Taylor determinacy principle that the
long-run interest rate response to deviations of inflation from target should
be greater than one-to-one in order to ensure that the Taylor rule delivers
an inflation rate equal to the targeted value (Clarida et al., 1998; Woodford,
2001).
When inflation is below 3.1 percent, however, our preferred model implies
that the authorities largely left interest rates to be determined randomly,
albeit with some weak but nevertheless statistically significant influence of the
output gap on interest rates, but apparently without worrying about expected
inflation at all, which would seem reasonable when the inflation target was so
close to being met.
5 Conclusion
In this paper we have reported estimates of a Taylor rule that appears ade-
quately to describe the interest rate-setting behaviour of the Bank of England
since formal inflation targeting was introduced in UKmonetary policy in 1992.
A key finding of our research, however, was that the estimated Taylor rule ex-
hibits significant nonlinearity such that, when inflation has been within a half
percent or so below its target of 2.5 percent per annum, the Taylor rule has
collapsed to a ‘random walk with a dragging anchor’, whereby interest rate
movements more or less follow a random walk unrelated to expected inflation
but with a small but statistically significant link to movements in the output
gap. When the inflation rate was more than about one half percent above
target, however, a standard forward-looking Taylor rule appears to kick in, in
11Taylor and Davradakis: Nonlinear Taylor Rule
Published by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2006
which the estimated coeﬃcients are strongly significant and achieve plausible
values.
Indeed, we would suggest that the results of our investigation are uncon-
troversial. Since the shift to inflation targeting in 1992, the Bank of England
has actively sought to increase the transparency of policy-making by, inter
alia, publishing the minutes of the meetings of the interest-rate setting com-
mittee (the Monetary Policy Committee) as well as detailed justification of
its inflation forecasts. As such, it is perhaps not surprising that its interest
rate-setting behaviour appears to be well captured by a Taylor rule. What
is new in our analysis is the finding of significant nonlinearity in this policy
setting, and in particular the finding that the standard Taylor rule really only
begins to bite once expected inflation is significantly above its target. This
suggests, for example, that while the stated objective of the Bank of England
is to pursue a symmetric inflation target, in practice some degree of asymme-
try has crept into interest-rate setting. Nevertheless, the very predictability of
the policy rule, especially when set out in a highly plausible and intuitive non-
linear framework, is perhaps one reason why the United Kingdom has, since
the early 1990s, enjoyed a period of price stability combined with relatively
strong growth.
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Table 1. Quasi Likelihood Ratio Test Results: Marginal
Significance Levels
(M1,M2) (M2,M3) (M3,M4) (M1,M10) (M10,M20)
Q− LR 0.0880 0.998 0.0394 0.0810 0.0522
Notes: Table entries correspond to the Q-LR test defined as Q − LR =
Jrestricted − Junrestricted, where Jf , for the f=restricted,unrestricted, is the ob-
jective function that GMMminimizes for the restricted and unrestricted mod-
els, respectively. Entries in square brackets stand for the marginal significance
level obtained after bootstrap simulations. Asterisk denotes significance at the
5 percent significance level.
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Table 2. Empirical Results for Models M1 to M4
it =
⎧
⎨
⎩
α0 + α1it−1 + α2πt,k + α3xt + t If πt ≥ π1
it−1 + t If π2 < πt < π1
β0 + β1it−1 + β2πt,k + β3xt + t If πt ≤ π2
k = 3 months, 1992:10-2003:01
M1 M2 M3 M4
π1 = π2 = bπ π2 = 0 π1 = π2 = 0
α0 1.6219* 1.6079* 1.5636* 0.4361*
(0.6313) (0.6191) (0.6339) (0.1661)
α1 0.4613* 0.4402* 0.4513* 0.9087*
(0.0757) (0.0724) (0.0738) (0.0263)
α2 0.6455* 0.7029* 0.6848* 0.0227
(0.3116) (0.2988) (0.3060) (0.0773)
α3 0.2540* 0.2432* 0.2281* 0.0832*
(0.1034) (0.1010) (0.1033) (0.0257)
β0 0.0313 -0.1523
(0.2786) (0.1469)
β1 0.9454* 0.9928*
(0.0333) (0.0226)
β2 0.0921 0.0686
(0.1042) (0.0621)
β3 0.0836* 0.0547*
(0.0266) (0.0203)
J 40.4016 44.6321 50.4776 72.6781
π1 3.10 3.10
π2 2.60bπ 3.10
Notes: Values in parenthesis stand for the standard deviation of the respective
estimate. Asterisk denotes significant entries at the 5% significance level. J is the
criterion function that GMM minimizes computed at parameter estimates.
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Table 3. Empirical Results for Models M10 and M20
it =
⎧
⎨
⎩
α0 + α1it−1 + α2πt,k + α3xt + t If πt ≥ π1
it−1 + t If π2 < πt < π1
it−1 + β3xt + t If πt ≤ π2
k = 3 months, 1992:10-2003:01
M10 M20
(π1 = π2 = bπ)
α0 1.5157* 1.5316*
(0.6221) (0.6216)
α1 0.4549* 0.4502*
(0.0724) (0.0723)
α2 0.6367* 0.7008*
(0.3002) (0.3001)
α3 0.2342* 0.2327*
(0.1014) (0.1013)
β3 0.0541* 0.0462*
(0.0209) (0.0193)
J 45.7704 46.8094
π1 3.10
π2 2.70bπ 3.10
Notes: Values in parenthesis stand for the standard deviation of the respective
estimate. Asterisk denotes significant entries at the 5%significance level. J is the
criterion function that GMM minimizes computed at parameter estimates.
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